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PUTTING THE REINS ON AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE LIABILITY:
WHY HORSE ACCIDENTS ARE THE BEST COMMON LAW
ANALOGY
David King*
Autonomous vehicles raise new liability questions on the road
because the vehicles themselves can act negligently, independent of
the human driver’s intentions. For now, these liability questions are
expected to be answered through the incremental common law
system, rather than by legislation. This means courts will draw
analogies and distinctions between autonomous vehicle accidents
and pre-existing case law precedent. What courts analogize
autonomous vehicle accidents with is likely to have a significant
effect on liability rules that determine the responsibilities of drivers,
manufacturers, and others.
Numerous theories have been proffered on what courts can or
should analogize autonomous vehicles with for liability purposes.
These include analogies with elevators, autopilot systems, and
human beings. Each of these analogy theories have some merit.
However, comparing autonomous vehicles to transportation by
horse is a superior, yet overlooked, analogy to autonomous vehicles
for liability purposes. Horses and autonomous vehicles can both
perceive and interpret the world around them, then engage in
dangerous maneuvers as a result of misunderstanding their
environment. This Recent Development explores the horse analogy
theory through the lens of different legal doctrines, such as
instrumentality of harm, assumption of the risk, and product
liability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Automated vehicles are a form of personalized transportation
whereby at least one critical function of the vehicle’s control is
delegated to a computer.1 Typically, the vehicle uses sensors, lasers,
cameras, and GPS to interpret its surroundings and make decisions
about its maneuvers.2 For example, an autonomous vehicle may
recognize pedestrians, cars, and bicyclists, then drive safely around
them.3 Tesla’s self-driving cars use a radar and a camera device to
see imminent dangers in front of the driver.4 Then, the Tesla
automatically applies the brakes when necessary to avoid a collision
or at least reduce the speed of impact.5 A Tesla also has sensors all
around the car to collect data about the path of the car’s lane and the

1
See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF
POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 3 (2017) [hereinafter NHTSA,
PRELIM.
STATEMENT],
https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/
pdf/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
2
Id.
3
Jeffrey R. Zohn, When Robots Attack: How Should the Law Handle Selfdriving Cars That Cause Damages, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 461, 481
(2015).
4
See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., AUTOMATIC VEHICLE
CONTROL SYSTEMS 2–4 (2017) [hereinafter NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION],
https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2016/INCLA-PE16007-7876.PDF (last visited
Sep 18, 2017).
5
Id.
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location of nearby vehicles.6 The car adjusts speed and direction to
ensure a safe distance from other vehicles.7
The concept of a self-driving car was first introduced by General
Motors at the 1939 World Fair.8 The Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (“DARPA”) rapidly increased technology
development by holding annual competitions where autonomous
vehicles attempted to complete an obstacle course.9 Over time, new
advancements in autonomous technology have allowed self-driving
cars to operate safely in an increasingly diverse range of
circumstances. 10 Now, autonomous vehicles are beginning to enter
the consumer market for the first time.11 The National Highway
Traffic Administration said this is the beginning of “a historic
turning point for automotive travel.”12 However, questions about the
legal implications of self-driving cars loom over this dramatic shift
in transportation.13
A. Legislation
Forty-one states have introduced autonomous vehicle legislation
since 2012,14 but the pending SELF DRIVE Act15 may be the most

6

Id. at 4.
Id.
8
PC MAGAZINE, Definition of: Driverless Car, PC MAGAZINE:
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/56628/driverlesscar (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
9
See id.
10
See Scott Le Vine, Alireza Zolfaghari, & John Polak, Autonomous Cars: The
Tension Between Occupant Experience and Intersection Capacity, TRANSP.
RESEARCH PART C 1, 1 (Mar. 2015).
11
See id.
12
NHTSA, PRELIM. STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 1.
13
Clifford Winston & Fed Mannering, Implementing Technology to Improve
Public Highway Performance: A Leapfrog Technology from the Private Sector Is
Going to Be Necessary, 3 ECON. TRANSP. 158, 164 (2014).
14
See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Autonomous Vehicles:
Self-driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enactedlegislation.aspx (last updated Oct. 23, 2017).
15
SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. (as passed by House of
Representatives, Sept. 7, 2017).
7
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significant legislative activity for autonomous vehicles to date.16 The
SELF DRIVE Act has been passed by the House of Representatives
and is now in front of the Senate for consideration.17 If passed, the
Act will allow up to 100,000 autonomous vehicles on public roads
for testing and data-collection purposes.18 The Act requires that the
federal government research, test, and certify the safety of
autonomous vehicle products, pre-empting any contrary state law.19
Meanwhile, it leaves “registration, licensing, driving education and
training, insurance, law enforcement, crash investigations, safety
and emissions inspections” within the authority of the states.20
The media has hailed the SELF DRIVE Act as a bipartisan
effort21 that lifts barriers to the advancement of autonomous
vehicles.22 Modern developments in self-driving cars may produce
significant economic and social benefits.23 Autonomous vehicles
could avoid the 94% of car accidents caused by human error,24

16

See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 14 (showing
that almost all legislation passed so far is for autonomous vehicle testing or to
empower a regulatory agency to develop substantive law).
17
Cecilia Kang, Self-driving Cars’ Prospects Rise with Vote by House, N.Y.
TIMES, (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/selfdriving-cars-prospects-rise-with-vote-by-congress.html?mcubz=1.
18
H.R. 3388 § 6(3).
19
Id. §§ 3, 4, 7.
20
Id. § 3.
21
See, e.g., Aarian Marshall, Congress Unites (Gasp) to Spread Self-driving
Cars Across America, WIRED, (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.wired.com/
story/congress-self-driving-car-law-bill/; Tony Romm, The House Approved a
Bill to Put More Self-Driving Cars on U.S. Roads — But the Senate will be
Another Story, RECODE, https://www.recode.net/2017/9/6/16259306/housesenate-self-driving-driverless-cars-autonomous (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
22
Kang, supra note 17.
23
See generally Adam Thierer & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to
Intelligent Vehicles & Driverless Cars, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 339, 339
(2015) (advocating against any legislation that may slow the advancement of
autonomous vehicle technology.).
24
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., CRITICAL REASONS FOR
CRASHES INVESTIGATED IN THE NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION
SURVEY
1
(2015),
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/
ViewPublication/812115.
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saving up to 30,000 lives per year in the United States alone.25 One
day, society may consider it morally reprehensible to drive a car
manually when automated cars—purged of human error—reduce
dangers to other drivers.26 Additionally, self-driving cars are
expected to improve traffic congestion, fuel usage, parking, mobility
for the disabled, and productivity for drivers.27 Autonomous vehicles
may one day be the commonplace norm for personalized
transportation.28 Many academics, journalists, and consumers have
called upon legislators to clear legal obstacles that may hinder
progress towards that future.29
Uncertainty about liability issues is one such obstacle.30
Autonomous vehicles will inevitably be involved in at least some
accidents.31 These accidents raise new liability questions as to who
will be responsible for the car’s negligence.32 Answers to these
questions could influence how much control of the vehicle a
manufacturer leaves with drivers, who buys insurance, and how
many people buy autonomous vehicles.33 According to the
Department of Transportation, “[r]ules and laws allocating tort

25

Janet Fleetwood, Public Health, Ethics, and Autonomous Vehicles, 107 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 532, 532 (2017).
26
See generally Robert Sparrow & Mark Howard, When Human Beings Are
Like Drunk Robots: Driverless Vehicles, Ethics, and the Future of Transport, 80
TRANSP. RES. PART C 206 (2017) (analogizing manual driving with drunk driving
in that it increases risks to others on the road).
27
Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 23, at 340.
28
See id. at 339.
29
See generally, e.g., id.
30
Winston & Mannering, supra note 13, at 164.
31
Justin Thomas, Comment, Putting Programmers in the Driver’s Seat: State
Tort Systems Applied to Autonomous Automobiles, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
553, 554 (2016); Damien A. Riehl, Car Minus Driver: Autonomous Vehicles
Driving Regulation, Liability, and Policy, BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 2016, at 21.
32
Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 23, at 360.
33
Id. at 361–62 (“The rationale for such legislative intervention would be
supported by the fact that autonomous vehicles represent a socially beneficial
technology that may be hindered by real or perceived liability concerns.”).
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liability could have a significant effect on both consumer acceptance
of [automated vehicles] and their rate of deployment.”34
It is possible future federal or state legislation will limit or alter
tort liability.35 Legislators have sometimes limited liability when the
magnitude of liability threatens to prevent a desirable product or
service from flourishing.36 Autonomous vehicles could be very
expensive to produce if manufacturers were exposed to the risk of
litigation for any accident the car is involved in throughout the life
of each vehicle.37
While the argument for legislative limits or exceptions to
manufacturer liability has some rationality, such legislation for new
technologies is the exception, not the norm.38 Additionally, the
SELF DRIVE Act implies a legislative intent to leave autonomous
vehicle liability to the common law tort system.39 The Act’s only
content on liability reads as follows:
“(e) COMMON LAW LIABILITY.(1) IN GENERAL. Compliance with a motor vehicle safety
standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person
from liability at common law.
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to preempt common law claims.”40
For the time being, liability rules for autonomous vehicles will likely
be determined by the courts through the common law system.

34
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED
VEHICLES
POLICY
46
(2016),
https://www.transportation.gov/
sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20guidance%20PDF.pdf.
35
Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between
Autonomous Vehicles & the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321,
1337 (2012) (“Another line of defense for autonomous vehicle manufacturers
would be legislation at either the federal or state level that would protect against,
or limit, liability.”).
36
See id. at 1337–38.
37
See id.
38
Id.
39
H.R. 3388 § 3(2)(e).
40
Id.
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B. Common Law
The SELF DRIVE Act leaves liability rules up to state common
law,41 but no common law precedent has been established for
autonomous vehicles. 42 How tort common law applies to owners,
drivers, manufacturers, or others in the context of an autonomous
vehicle is unclear.43 Many liability rules will likely develop
incrementally over time through the common law system and may
depend on the facts of each individual case or the jurisdiction of the
accident.44 Additionally, the United States Department of
Transportation’s report on a fatal autonomous vehicle accident in
Florida provides some guidance from an administrative agency.45
What common law precedent courts analogize with self-driving
cars will likely be critical to autonomous vehicle liability rules. One
analogy theory suggests that courts could compare autonomous
vehicles to elevators, which used to be operated manually but later
became more automated.46 This analogy would result in autonomous
vehicle owners being responsible for most injuries, even when
someone else is driving, because owners must ensure the vehicle is
in safe operating condition.47 Another analogy theory suggests that
41

Id.
Marchant & Lindor, supra note 35, at 1324 (“Not surprisingly, there has not
been any reported personal injury litigation regarding these products to date.”).
43
Thomas, supra note 31, at 554 (“The law regarding autonomous vehicle
liability, however, is unclear.”).
44
Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 23, at 361 (“Legal standards here could
evolve gradually through the common law as they have for traditional automobiles
and many other technologies.”).
45
See generally NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4.
46
Kyle Colonna, Autonomous Cars & Tort Liability, 4 CASE W. RESERVE J.L.
TECH. & INTERNET 81, 91–92 (2012).
47
26 AM. JUR. 2D Elevators and Escalators § 13 (2017) (stating property
owners are liable for defective construction, negligent operation, or poor
maintenance of an elevator, unless close inspection would not have revealed the
danger); Zohn, supra note 3 (“The person inside an elevator at the time of the
accident cannot be held liable unless they are exceptionally negligent.”); K.
Krasnow Waterman & Matthew T. Henshon, Imagine the Ram-If-Ications
Assessing Liability for Robotics-based Car Accidents, ABA SciTech Law., at 15
(Spring 2009), at 15 (2009) (“[E]levator lawsuits almost always arise from injury
to occupants of a malfunctioning elevator, not due to injuries to other elevators or
the persons riding inside them.”).
42
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courts analogize autonomous vehicles to autopilot systems.48 This
approach would result in drivers being liable for most accidents,
because of their misuse of, or excessive reliance on, the car’s
autonomous features.49 Finally, another proposed theory analogizes
an autonomous vehicle to a human driver by proposing a
“reasonable car” standard.50 Under this analogy, the manufacturer
would be liable any time an autonomous vehicle does not act
reasonably.51
This Recent Development argues that the most compelling
analogy theory for liability purposes is to compare autonomous
vehicles to transportation by horses. Horses and self-driving cars are
both property owned and operated by humans, but with a mind of
their own. Both horses and autonomous vehicles can perceive their
surroundings, misinterpret the danger of objects or events around
them, and make dangerous maneuvers not intended by their human
driver.52 The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part II reviews the preexisting theories courts will analogize autonomous vehicles with,
namely elevators, autopilot systems, or human beings. Part III
introduces the horse analogy and discusses how it would apply to
autonomous vehicles. Additionally, it examines the horse analogy
through the lens of different liability doctrines, such as product
liability, imputed passenger liability, and assumption of the risk.
48

Marchant & Lindor, supra note 35, at 1324–25.
Dylan LeValley, Comment, Autonomous Vehicle Liability-Application of
Common Carrier Liability, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. SUPRA 5, 9 (2013) (“[M]ost
litigation over liability arising from an accident involving an autopilot has
determined that human error by the operators, not malfunctioning of the
autopilots, was the cause of the accident.”).
50
See generally K.C. Webb, Products Liability & Autonomous Vehicles: Who’s
Driving Whom?, 23 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
9, 34 (2016),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/2017/05/13/volume23_issue4_webb/ (advocating for the
reasonable car standard based on an analogy with human drivers).
51
Id. at 34.
52
Compare Neal Boudette, Tesla’s Self-driving System Cleared in Deadly
Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
01/19/business/tesla-model-s-autopilot-fatal-crash.html?mcubz=1 (reporting on a
self-driving Tesla that saw a truck, failed to understand it was a dangerous object,
and drove straight into it.), with Alpha Constr. Co. v. Branham, 337 S.W.2d 790
(Ky. 1960) (discussing a case where a horse heard noises from a truck, failed to
understand it was not dangerous, and jumped into the street in fright.).
49
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II. CURRENT ANALOGY THEORIES
Academics have proffered numerous theories about what
common law precedent courts will use to analogize with
autonomous vehicles.53 This section will discuss pre-existing
analogy theories for (1) elevators, (2) autopilot systems, and (3)
human drivers.
A. Elevators
One of the more popular analogy theories that courts could
compare autonomous vehicles to is elevators.54 Elevators can be
thought of as a vehicle that transports people vertically.55 They used
to be operated manually, but at some point became more
automated.56 Many elevators even engage in a type of intelligent
traffic flow, whereby each elevator in a set chooses which floor to
go to based on the direction passengers are heading.57 A passenger
on an elevator is not expected to oversee the elevator’s “driving”
decisions. 58 Passengers merely press a button to reach their
destination.59
Barring extraordinary circumstances, elevator users are not
liable for injuries they suffer in an elevator60 because it is difficult
53

See, e.g., Colonna, supra note 46, at 86 (mentioning biotechnology, autopilot,
elevators, autonomous trains, and robots); Marchant & Lindor, supra note 35, at
1324–25 (mentioning autopilot, cruise control, and industrial robots); Webb,
supra note 50, at 33–37, 48 (mentioning elevators, autopilot, automotive
technology, and humans); Zohn, supra note 3, at 481–84 (mentioning elevators
and autopilot).
54
Colonna, supra note 46, at 86; Webb, supra note 50, at 33–37; Zohn, supra
note 3, at 480 (“[The] two most analogous technologies are elevators and autopilot
on airplanes and ships.”).
55
Colonna, supra note 46, at 102.
56
Id. at 91–92.
57
Waterman & Henshon, supra note 47, at 3 (“[I]n recent years, smart
technology has been introduced to create efficient traffic flow in a bank
of elevators.”).
58
See Zach Matthews & Christopher K. Jones, Defending the First Wave:
Autonomous Trucking and the Death of Driver Negligence?, 57 No. 12 DRI For
Def. 59 at 61 (noting that since the 1970s, elevators have been almost entirely
computer controlled).
59
Waterman & Henshon, supra note 47, at 15.
60
Zohn, supra note 3, at 483.
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for passengers to be negligent while inside a self-driving box they
have little control over.61 Accidents almost always occur because of
a malfunction of the elevator.62 The landlord that owns and controls
the elevator is liable for most injuries63 because owners are expected
to inspect, maintain, and repair their elevators to ensure safe
operating condition.64
In most states, the owner of an elevator has a heightened duty of
care as a common carrier.65 A common carrier is a person or
organization that transports human passengers as a service.66
Common carriers have a duty of utmost care, rather than that of a
reasonable person, because passengers place their body into the
common carrier’s exclusive control, entrusting the service’s
locomotives and procedures with their safety.67 Although it has been
argued that autonomous vehicle manufacturers would be common
carriers under the elevator analogy,68 common carrier liability
attaches to the owner of an elevator, not the manufacturer.69 Under
the elevator analogy, the owner of an autonomous vehicle would be
liable in most accidents for failing to ensure the safety of occupants
in their vehicle, even if the owner was not “driving” at the time an
accident occurred.
61

See generally Mark A. Franklin, California’s Extension of Common Carrier
Liability to Roller Coasters & Similar Devices: An Examination of Gomez v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles, 34 W. ST. U. L. REV. 29 (2006) (stating that the
justification for shifting liability to common carriers like elevator operators is that
passengers have little control over the vehicle and rely completely on the common
carrier for their safety).
62
Matthews & Jones, supra note 58, at 61 (“elevator lawsuits almost always
arise from injury to occupants of a malfunctioning elevator, not due to injuries to
other elevators or the persons riding inside them”).
63
50 N.Y. JUR. 2D Elevators and Escalators § 23 (2017).
64
26 AM. JUR. 2D Elevators and Escalators § 10 (2017).
65
Matthews & Jones, supra note 58, at 61.
66
See generally Franklin, supra note 61.
67
Id.
68
See generally LeValley, supra note 49 (arguing in part IV that autonomous
vehicle manufacturers should owe a duty similar to that of common carriers).
69
Willoughby v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 87 S.W.3d 509, 512 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2002); Matthews & Jones, supra note 58, at 61; see also Tim Higgins, The
End of
Car Ownership, WALL ST. J. (June
20, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-end-of-car-ownership-1498011001.

Dec. 2017]

Autonomous Vehicle Liability

137

In a distant future, autonomous vehicles that are analogous to
elevators may be commonplace. Individual car ownership could
fade in favor of cars owned by businesses and provided as a
service.70 For a small fee, users could tap a button on their
smartphone app to hail an autonomous vehicle to their location, get
in the car, and be transported to their destination.71 This could all be
done in a self-driving car that lacks any meaningful controls or
driver responsibilities for the human passenger.72 Autonomous
vehicles could even operate on a track, like elevators do.73
However, the elevator analogy theory relies on a vision for
autonomous vehicles in a distant future. Unlike elevators, personal
autonomous vehicles are expected to require some degree of human
control and oversight for the foreseeable future.74 Experts predict it
will take ten to twenty years for autonomous vehicles to be able to
drive themselves safely under most circumstances.75 To provide
autonomous vehicle transportation as a service—shifting ownership
of vehicles from individuals to common carriers—would require
fully automated technology.76 Most research predicts this level of
automation will not make a significant presence on the road until the

70

Id. See generally Daniel J. Fagnant & Kara M. Kockelman, The Travel and
Environmental Implications of Shared Autonomous Vehicles, Using Agent-based
Model Scenarios, 40 TRANSP. RES. PART C 1–13 (2014).
71
Higgins, supra note 69.
72
Douglas Ernst, Ford: Autonomous Cars with No Steering Wheel, Gas and
Break
Pedals
by
2021,
WASH.
TIMES
(Aug.
16,
2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/16/ford-autonomous-carswith-no-steering-wheel-gas-an/ (last visited Nov 2, 2017).
73
Tina Amirtha, Forget Self-driving Cars: Here’s How Driverless Trains Are
Moving Ahead, ZDNET (April 6, 2017), http://www.zdnet.com/article/forget-selfdriving-cars-heres-how-driverless-trains-are-moving-ahead/ (last visited Nov 2,
2017).
74
Mica R. Endsley, From Here to Autonomy, 59 HUMAN FACTORS 5, 21 (2017).
75
See generally Zia Wadud, Don MacKenzie, & Paul Leiby, Help or
Hindrance? The Travel, Energy and Carbon Impacts of Highly Automated
Vehicles, 86 TRANSP. RES. Part A 5 (2016).
76
Id. at 3, 7, 10 (discussing transportation provided as a service through
autonomous vehicles owned by the service, once level 4 automation (complete
automation) is achieved).
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2030s or 2040s.77 Furthermore, autonomous vehicles are generally
being developed to understand and respond to the world around
them, not to operate on a track.78 The elevator analogy may be
compelling for futurists, but no sensible consumer, manufacturer, or
other party has a practical need to speculate about liability rules
several decades in the future.
Also, even in a distant future where autonomous vehicles are
analogous to elevators, the analogy would have little utility. If
autonomous vehicle transportation is provided as a service and the
locomotive is automated with no meaningful control by the driver,
the service provider (not the manufacturer) would be a common
carrier.79 The passenger, lacking any significant driving
responsibilities, would be subjected to the provider’s exclusive
control.80 A novel type of vehicle (self-driving cars) would not cloud
common carrier status.81 In a future where autonomous vehicle
transportation is provided as a service by a common carrier, it would
be much more practical to analogize the service provider to any
number of other common carriers, such as taxis or autonomous
trains, rather than elevators.82
Furthermore, the elevator analogy does not conform to a sensible
distribution of liability in foreseeable autonomous vehicle accident

77

Prateek Bansal & Kara M. Kockelman, Forecasting Americans’ Long-term
Adoption of Connected and Autonomous Vehicle Technologies, 95 TRANSP.
RESEARCH PART A 49–63 (2017).
78
See e.g. Zohn, supra note 3, at 481 (“During these test drives, the cars have
successfully navigated jaywalking pedestrians, cars lurching out of hidden
driveways, double-parked delivery trucks, and bicyclists who were not following
street laws.”).
79
See generally Franklin, supra note 61, at 33–37 (discussing the extension of
common carrier liability to rollercoaster operators in California).
80
See id. at 36.
81
11 TERESA J. FARRIS, PAUL R. KEANE & RAYMOND J. KENNEY,
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE: MOTOR VEHICLE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8:2 (4th ed.
2017), Westlaw MAPRAC (“[M]eager evidence is sufficient to establish its status
as [a common carrier]”).
82
Colonna, supra note 46, at 102 (“Autonomous trains are analogous to
elevators, except that autonomous trains operate on a horizontal axis instead of a
vertical axis.”); FARRIS ET AL., supra note 81, § 8:2 (“An owner-operator of
taxicabs may properly be regarded as a common carrier of passengers for hire[.]”).
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scenarios. It is rare for an elevator passenger to be negligent.83 In
contrast, human drivers are “[a]t the heart of safety concerns” in
autonomous vehicles. 84 For example, a human driver may fail to take
over manual control when prompted, may tell the vehicle to exceed
the speed limit, or may use the self-driving features on a road for
which they are not intended.85
Finally, the elevator analogy does not conform to the
Department of Transportation’s guidance based on a fatal
autonomous vehicle accident in Florida.86 The elevator analogy
would imply passengers have no responsibilities as they are
transported in a common carrier’s self-driving box. In the report, the
Department of Transportation mentioned the “driver”
approximately 75 times.87 It pointed out that the driver did not pay
attention, did not follow the car’s instructions, and took no action to
avoid collision.88 Elevator users do not have any analogous duties.
The report said manufacturers could be responsible for an accident
caused by foreseeable abuse of the autonomous vehicle by the
owner.89 This is in stark contrast to the common carrier liability

83

Matthews & Jones, supra note 58, at 61 (“[E]levator lawsuits almost always
arise from injury to occupants of a malfunctioning elevator, not due to injuries to
other elevators or the persons riding inside them.”).
84
Francesca M. Favarò et al., Examining Accident Reports Involving
Autonomous Vehicles in California, 12 PLOS ONE e0184952 at 2 (September 20,
2017),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371
/journal.pone.0184952&type=printable.
85
See NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4, at 1, 9–12 (indicating
driver can be responsible for an accident by failing to pay attention to the road,
ignoring the car’s warnings, and not reading the owner’s manual); David
Shepardson, Tesla Driver in Fatal ‘Autopilot’ Crash Got Numerous Warnings:
U.S. Government, REUTERS, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-teslacrash/tesla-driver-in-fatal-autopilot-crash-got-numerous-warnings-u-sgovernment-idUSKBN19A2XC (last visited Sep 20, 2017) (mentioning that the
driver was exceeding the speed limit).
86
NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4, at 1.
87
Id. at 1–12.
88
Id. at 1.
89
Id. at 10 n. 19.
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elevators impart to owners of the vehicle to protect their passengers
against foreseeable harms.90
Someday autonomous vehicles may be more analogous to a
common carrier, leaving almost all liability exposure with the
business that is providing a transportation service. However, by then
there may also be more legislative controls, and it would be more
sensible to analogize autonomous vehicles with taxis or autonomous
trains than the counter-intuitive elevator analogy. Speculating about
a distant future can be an interesting intellectual exercise, but is not
a recipe for practical and actionable analysis.
B. Autopilot
Another analogy theory is that courts could compare
autonomous vehicles to the autopilot systems used in ships and
planes.91 This analogy addresses some of the issues of the elevator
theory. Autopilot involves partially automated control of a vehicle,
with oversight from a human pilot.92 Most autopilot features observe
and respond to a dynamic environment, such as changes in wind,
other vessels, and wildlife,93 rather than operating on a track as an
elevator does.
In most cases, pilots and their employers are liable for accidents
involving autopilot systems.94 Technically, liability attaches to the
90

See 6 WASH. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
WASHINGTON PRACTICE: PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS WPI 100.03 (6th ed.
2013), Westlaw WAPRAC; 4 HENRY P. TRAWICK, JR., FLORIDA PLEADING AND
PRACTICE FORMS § 33:19 (2017), Westlaw FL-PP (stating that a common carrier
can even be liable for foreseeable criminal assaults by other passengers).
91
Zohn, supra note 3, at 481–82.
92
LeValley, supra note 49, at 9–10 (“In the contexts of airplanes and ships,
constant oversight is both implied and expected, thus reducing the role of the
autonomous technology.”); Webb, supra note 50, at 26 (“Nor do AVs fit well into
a category with autopilot systems for airplanes and boats, which require human
vigilance and intervention. Requiring human vigilance of AVs is incomparable to
autopilot systems because pilots are highly trained, air traffic is highly regulated,
and there are far less planes in the sky than cars on the road.”).
93
Zohn, supra note 3, at 481.
94
LeValley, supra note 49, at 9 (“[M]ost litigation over liability arising from
an accident involving an autopilot has determined that human error by the
operators, not malfunctioning of the autopilots, was the cause of the accident.”).
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manufacturer of the autopilot system, unless there is evidence of
negligence by the pilot.95 In practice, there is almost always enough
evidence of pilot negligence to shift liability.96 For example, pilots
can be liable for using a boat’s autopilot system in shallow water for
which it was not intended, or for loading an airplane with
imbalanced cargo which the autopilot could not handle.97 Most
airplane autopilot accidents are caused by misuse of autopilot during
take-off or landing, where use of autopilot is discouraged.98
Manufacturers do not have a duty to train pilots on how to use their
autopilot software safely.99 Applying the autopilot analogy to
autonomous vehicles would impart liability on drivers in most cases,
such as for using the autonomous features incorrectly, failing to
learn to use the autonomous features safely, or not addressing the
autonomous features’ limitations.
Autopilot is a stronger analogy than elevators, but also has some
substantial distinctions from autonomous vehicles. The level of
attention and training expected of a professional, licensed pilot is
not comparable to what is expected from the average automobile
driver.100 Studies show consumers do not perform well at
maintaining vigilance over long periods of time in a task that is not
substantially interactive.101 Additionally, most autopilot technology
on ships and planes is intended to keep the vehicle on a straight path
determined by the pilot or make slight changes along the path
without getting pushed off-course by wind or current.102 In contrast,

95

Zohn, supra note 3, at 481.
Id. (“Historically, the majority of autopilot accidents have been caused by
human error of the pilot.”).
97
Id. at 481–82.
98
Id. at 481.
99
Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 582 (Minn. 2012).
100
Zohn, supra note 3, at 482.
101
Webb, supra note 50, at 26 (“Ergonomic research indicates human brains
are not good at routine supervision tasks, so if an AV goes for many miles without
incident, the human driver will likely stop paying attention.”).
102
See Colonna, supra note 46, at 94–95 (“Most autopilots work by making
slight changes in the heading of the plane and do not require significant
adaptations.”); LeValley, supra note 49, at 10.
96
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an autonomous vehicle might make discrete choices to stop, go, or
turn and respond to the vehicles around it.103
The autopilot analogy conforms to some of the guidance
provided by the Department of Transportation in its report about a
fatal autonomous vehicle accident in Florida.104 However, the report
is aligned with the outcome of applying the autopilot analogy only
because the driver’s negligence was extraordinary. In the Florida
accident, the driver was watching a Harry Potter movie105 and
ignored repeated warnings from the car to take over manual
control.106 The autonomous vehicle hit a truck that was visible for
seven seconds, yet the driver made no effort to avoid collision.107
Additionally, the driver was using the autonomous features on city
streets, whereas it was only intended for freeway use.108 The
autopilot analogy makes sense for this accident but becomes less
applicable in a more nuanced case.
For example, in autopilot case law, a pilot can be liable for
improperly loading a plane.109 However, the Department of
Transportation has found that manufacturers can be liable for
accidents caused by foreseeable misuse of the product by the
owner.110 This indicates that autonomous vehicles can shift some
liability away from the amateur driver and onto the manufacturer, as
compared to autopilot cases. The Department of Transportation
report described some potential duties of autonomous vehicle
manufacturers that included alerting the driver of limitations of the
autopilot system, developing a method for ensuring the driver is
paying attention, minimizing the potential for confusion about
whether autopilot is engaged, and considering limiting functionality
103

LeValley, supra note 49, at 10.
See generally NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4, at 1, 5–6.
105
Id.
106
Shepardson, supra note 85.
107
Id.
108
NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4, at 4 (“The Tesla Model S
owner’s manual states that TACC ‘is primarily intended for driving on dry,
straight roads, such as highways and freeways. It should not be used on city
streets.’”).
109
Zohn, supra note 3, at 481–82.
110
NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4, at 10.
104
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on roads for which autopilot is inappropriate.111 These duties differ
from the more limited responsibilities of autopilot system
manufacturers, who are selling to professional pilots.112
Under the autopilot analogy theory, most liability would be
given to autonomous vehicle drivers for misusing the autopilot or
failing to recognize its limitations. In comparison, autonomous
vehicle accidents will likely involve a higher burden on
manufacturers, who cannot expect their customers to be professional
drivers.
C. Reasonable Car
Another analogy theory is that the courts could compare
autonomous vehicles with human drivers, creating a reasonable car
standard.113 The reasonable car standard could be evaluated by
taking data the autonomous vehicle collects just before an accident
and evaluating whether most autonomous vehicles would have
avoided the collision in similar circumstances.114 The standard of
reasonableness would adjust as the average performance of
autonomous vehicles improves with technology.115
This analogy would conform to a common theory that the
proliferation of autonomous vehicles will result in giving
manufacturers, rather than drivers, liability for most accidents.116
One journal went as far as to say autonomous vehicles will be “the
death of driver negligence.”117 However, the reasonable car theory
does leave room for a negligent driver to misuse a reasonable car.118
The reasonable person doctrine is the basis for the reasonable
car standard. The reasonable person is an abstract “mythical

111

Id. at 5–6.
Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 583 (Minn. 2012).
113
Webb, supra note 50, at 34.
114
Id. at 48.
115
Id. at 49.
116
See, e.g., Riehl, supra note 31 (“The advent of autonomous vehicles points
to a seemingly inescapable shift in historical standards for auto crashes—from
driver/owner liability to a product liability regime.”).
117
Matthews & Jones, supra note 58, at 59.
118
Webb, supra note 50, at 34–35.
112
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creation” that represents a “community ideal.”119 Sometimes it can
be reversible error to compare the reasonable person to an actual
human being.120 The reasonable person knows how human beings
behave and possesses widely known knowledge of common
dangers.121 Often a reasonable person may be framed in the context
of the “Hand Formula” whereby the jury determines whether the
risks of the defendant’s actions were reasonable when compared to
the burden of safeguarding against those risks.122
This concept does not apply well to autonomous vehicles. First,
the courts have never applied the reasonable person standard to
property, even when that property is autonomous. For example, the
owner of an autonomous living animal, not the animal itself, may be
subject to the reasonable person standard.123
Second, the reasonable car standard would be difficult to apply
to actual accidents, such as the one in Florida.124 There, the vehicle
did not recognize a white truck against a bright sky and drove
straight into the truck.125 How would one apply the Hand Formula in
this scenario? The autonomous vehicle did not weigh the risks
against the burden of safeguards. Rather, it failed to interpret the
world around it. In contrast, applying the Learned Hand formula to
software design choices has robust, legal precedent and established
law.126 Software designers can be negligent by poorly weighing the

119

Peter N. Swisher, Robert E. Draim & David D. Hudgins, The Objective
Reasonable Person Standard of Care, 13 VIRGINIA PRACTICE: TORT AND
PERSONAL INJURY LAW § 3:3 (2015).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Extending Learned Hand’s
Negligence Formula to Information Security Breaches, 3 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 237, 241 (2007). See generally Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand
Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1994).
123
ALLISON E. BUTLER, 33 CAUSES OF ACTION 293 § 7 (2007 2d ed.).
124
NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4; Boudette, supra note 52.
125
Boudette, supra note 52.
126
See Donald R. Ballman, Software Tort: Evaluating Software Harm by Duty
of Function & Form, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 417, 461 (1997). See generally Rustad &
Koenig, supra note 122 (comprehensive paper on applying the Learned Hand
formula to data security).
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inconvenience of a safety feature against the risks caused by its
absence. 127
Third, a reasonable car standard merely introduces a new and
unnecessary concept that competes with the pre-existing legal
doctrine of industry custom. Custom in an industry can be an
important factor in determining the reasonableness of a design
choice and is based on what reasonable precautions competitors
have taken.128 The doctrine of industry custom enjoys a long and
developed history, whereas the reasonable car standard is a novel
approach that simply reiterates the need to compare the car to those
manufactured by other brands.
Most modern products liability cases focus on design defects
made by human beings.129 The reasonable car theory would be a bold
departure from pre-existing legal precedent. It would amount to
abandoning the legal tradition of drawing analogies and distinctions
from pre-existing precedent, rather than creating new law from the
bench.
III. THE HORSE THEORY
A stronger analogy is to compare autonomous vehicles to horses,
a much older form of autonomous property that has a long history
of being used for transportation. Both horses and self-driving cars
can perceive their environment, misunderstand their surroundings,
and make dangerous maneuvers, independent of the human
operator’s will.130
For example, in Alpha Construction v. Branham, a horse
walking on the side of a road heard loud noises from a truck, thought
127

Ballman, supra note 126.
See generally David A. Urban, Custom’s Proper Role in Strict Product.
Liability Actions Based on Design Defect, 38 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990).
129
Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Summary and Comment—Generally,
96 A.L.R.3d 22 § 2(a) (1979).
130
Compare Boudette, supra note 52 (reporting that a self-driving Tesla saw a
large object in front of it, did not properly interpret it as a white truck against a
bright sky, and drove straight into it), with Alpha Constr. Co. v. Branham, 337
S.W.2d 790 (Ky. 1960) (discussing a case where a horse heard noises from a large
truck, falsely interpreted it as something dangerous, and jumped in front of it in
fright).
128
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it was dangerous, got spooked, and galloped into the street.131 In the
Tesla accident in Florida, the autonomous vehicle saw a white truck
against a bright sky, though it was not dangerous, and drove straight
into the truck.132 In both cases, the locomotive failed to make what
most humans would consider a common-sense interpretation of the
dangers around them. The vehicles made dangerous maneuvers
because they lacked adequate intelligence to genuinely understand
their surroundings.
Although horses and cars may seem like very different objects
today, there was a time when it was not so unusual to compare the
two. In the early 1900s, some people would call cars “a machine
with a horse like quality” or a “horseless carriage.”133 In 1940, one
United States Army colonel said: “[a] machine has no life; horses
have—that is the radical difference.”134 From a liability perspective,
the transition from horses to cars meant moving from a vehicle with
a mind of its own, to one that rarely acts against the driver’s orders.
Autonomous vehicles have not returned “life” to vehicles, but they
have given vehicles the ability to think and act on their own, which
is a characteristic more analogous to transportation by horse. It does
not necessarily make a legal difference that a horse is made of blood
and bone whereas an autonomous vehicle is made of steel and
computer boards.135 Perhaps the reason a horse analogy has been
overlooked is that academics have only considered what technology
autonomous vehicles could be analogized with.136
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See Alpha Constr. Co. v. Branham, 337 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. 1960).
See Boudette, supra note 52.
133
IMES CHIU, THE EVOLUTION FROM HORSE TO AUTOMOBILE: A
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL STUDY 59 (2009).
134
Id. at 2.
135
See, e.g., Colonna, supra note 46, at 130 (“[T]he combination of software
and hardware is somewhat analogous to a human’s skeletal and central nervous
systems.”).
136
See, e.g., Marchant & Lindor, supra note 35, at 1324 (“There are, however,
a number of analogous technologies that have been the subject of litigation.”)
(emphasis added); Zohn, supra note 3, at 481 (“Each state can choose which
technology to model their civil liability after, but the two most analogous
technologies are elevators and autopilot on airplanes and ships.”) (emphasis
added).
132
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As with the other analogy theories, the horse analogy has its own
pitfalls. Horses are widely known for being unpredictable and
dangerous.137 In contrast, autonomous vehicles are considered safer
and less erratic than human drivers, in most circumstances. 138 In
some ways, horses are less autonomous than some self-driving cars.
On a horse, decisions regarding when to stop, go, or turn are
typically controlled by individual human commands.139 In other
ways, the horse is more autonomous. The rider of a horse may lose
complete control,140 whereas an autonomous vehicle may allow the
human driver to take over at any time.141 Finally, horses probably
require more skill to ride than autonomous vehicles take to use.142
For both horses and autonomous vehicles, safety can be improved
by the rider’s skill and experience.143

137

Kirrilly Thompson, Paul McGreevy & Phil McManus, A Critical Review of
Horse-Related Risk: A Research Agenda for Safer Mounts, Riders and Equestrian
Cultures, 5 ANIMALS 561 (2015) (stating horse riding is more dangerous than
motorcycles, skiing, and football).
138
See, e.g., Nidhi Kalra & Susan M. Paddock, Driving to Safety: How Many
Miles of Driving Would It Take to Demonstrate Autonomous Vehicle Reliability?,
94 TRANSP. RES. PART A 182, 182–83 (2016) (“Autonomous vehicles have the
potential to significantly mitigate this public health crisis by eliminating many of
the mistakes that human drivers routinely make. To begin with, autonomous
vehicles are never drunk, distracted, or tired[.]”) (citation omitted).
139
See generally CLAIRE LILLEY, STOP, GO, TURN: PERFECTING THE BASICS OF
RIDING (2014).
140
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shoaf, 4 Ohio App. 3d 122, 446
(1982) (discussing a case where a horse owner lost control).
141
The Long, Winding Road for Driverless Cars, ECONOMIST (May 25. 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21722628-forgethype-about-autonomous-vehicles-being-around-cornerreal-driverless-cars-will
(last visited Oct 17, 2017) (“[T]he driver must be ready to take full control of the
vehicle at any instant.”).
142
See generally LILLEY, supra note 139 (stating that it can take months or years
to perfect basic riding technique).
143
Siraj Shaikh, A Framework for Analysing Driver Interactions with SemiAutonomous Vehicles, FIRST INT’L WORKSHOP FORMAL TECH. FOR SAFETYCRITICAL SYS., 85 (2012); Meredith Chapman & Kirrilly Thompson, Preventing
and Investigating Horse-related Human Injury and Fatality in Work and Nonwork Equestrian Environments: A Consideration of the Workplace Health and
Safety Framework, 6 ANIMALS 33 (2016).
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These differences—the degree of skill, danger, and
predictability of the vehicle—speak to the degree of precaution
expected of a reasonable person under the circumstances. 144 In this
way, the horse analogy shares milder forms of the same
shortcomings of the autopilot analogy: a greater degree of skill and
oversight expected from the operator of the vehicle. However, since
greater skills and precaution are expected of pilots than horseback
riders, the horse analogy is much closer to autonomous vehicles.
The following sub-sections will further explore the horse
analogy from the perspective of different parties and legal doctrines.
A. Other Drivers
Any number of third parties could be negligent for creating
circumstances likely to confuse an autonomous vehicle.145 For
example, a black car driving at night with broken headlights could
confuse an autonomous vehicle that does not recognize it against a
dark background.146 There is no analogous equivalent for pilots
because there are too few planes in the air to create routine visual
stimuli for an autopilot.147 Autopilot systems may respond to wind
and wildlife,148 but these obstacles do not have a legal duty to act
reasonably like other drivers do. Elevators also have no analogous
case law, because they operate on a track in two directions without
perceiving, or responding to, their environment.149
In contrast, case law for horse accidents is more analogous to
autonomous vehicles, because horses interpret and respond to the
actions of other drivers. In the early 1900s, cars and horses
144
See LEE S. KREINDLER ET AL., 14 NEW YORK PRACTICE SERIES - NEW YORK
LAW OF TORTS § 7:2 (regarding circumstances as a part of the reasonable person
standard).
145
See 4A FLA. JUR. 2D Automobiles and Other Vehicles § 694 (2017) (stating
drivers have a duty not to frighten horses).
146
See Boudette, supra note 52 (regarding an autonomous Tesla confused by
the vehicle being the same color as the backdrop).
147
See Webb, supra note 50, at 35 (“[T]here are far less planes in the sky than
cars on the road[.]”)
148
See Zohn, supra note 3, at 481 (“[A]utopilot in ships and airplanes are
capable of handling unpredictable outside conditions such as wind, other boats
and planes, or even wildlife.”).
149
Webb, supra note 50, at 34–35.
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frequently shared the road.150 Horse riders and car drivers had equal
rights to the road, which implied a reciprocal duty for drivers and
horseback riders not to interfere with each other’s rights to use the
road safely and reasonably.151 This meant car drivers had a duty to
exhibit common sense knowledge of noises and maneuvers that may
trigger erratic behavior in nearby horses.152 For example, if a driver
notices the car’s approach is causing a horse to act erratically, the
driver may have to slow down to prevent scaring the horse further
with the vehicle, mitigating the risk.153
In Branham, a truck driver going less than 35 miles per hour and
creating a regular amount of noise was not considered negligent for
frightening a horse with the vehicle’s approach, causing the horse to
gallop into the highway.154 There, the court said it is not negligent to
engage in the ordinary lawful use of a vehicle and the driver had a
right to presume the horse would act safely.155 The horse’s ears
perking up was not enough to put the driver on notice that the truck
was scaring the horse.156 In contrast, in McIntyre v. Orner, a driver
going only 15 mph near a horse-drawn carriage was liable for
scaring the horses, causing the carriage to throw the passengers.157
There, the driver failed to stop his car, even after seeing that it was
frightening the horses.158 The court said the driver should have
known cars were “strange objects to horses” and could cause them
to act erratically.159
This precedent offers a practical standard from which to evaluate
the hypothetical discussed earlier in this section. To decide whether
the driver of a black car with broken headlights was negligent by
confusing an autonomous vehicle, the court would need to ask: (1)
whether it was lawful or ordinary use; (2) whether a reasonable
150

See generally McIntyre v. Orner, 166 Ind. 57 N.E. 750 (1906) (discussing
cars and horses sharing the road).
151
Id. at 752.
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Id.
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Id.
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Alpha Constr. Co. v. Branham, 337 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Ky. 1960).
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Id. at 63.
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person would know a black car with no headlights may cause erratic
behavior in autonomous vehicles; and (3) whether a reasonable
driver would have noticed the effect their car was having on a
neighboring autonomous vehicle and taken precautions to avoid the
accident. Horses used to be quite common and their behaviors
widely known. In contrast, the reasonable person may not know
their behavior was likely to confuse an autonomous vehicle in a
wider range of cases.
The autonomous vehicle accident in Florida helps illustrate this
theory.160 In the accident, a white truck against a bright sky confused
the autonomous vehicle.161 The truck driver was charged with a right
of way traffic violation162 but was not charged for negligently
confusing the autonomous vehicle. Naturally, something that is as
lawful and ordinary as driving a white truck in daylight would not
be negligent under the horse analogy.
B. Instrumentality of Harm
Property owners are expected to use ordinary care in controlling
who has access to their property.163 Owners can be liable for
negligence if they knew, or should have known, that giving their
property to another would create an unreasonable risk of foreseeable
injury due to the recipient’s youth, inexperience, or other
circumstances. 164 For example, loaning a car to an unlicensed or
intoxicated driver is negligence per se, because lack of proper skill
or competence to drive safely is presumed.165

160

See NHTSA, DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, supra note 4.
Boudette, supra note 52.
162
Shepardson supra note 85 (“[T]ruck driver was charged with a right of way
traffic violation.”).
163
See H.D. Warren, Annotation, Common-Law Liability on Entrusting
Automobile to Incompetent, Reckless, or Unlicensed Driver, 168 A.L.R. 1364
(1947).
164
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (AM. LAW INST.) (1965).
165
Karen J. Ellmore, Negligent Entrustment of Motor Vehicle to Unlicensed
Driver, 55 A.L.R.4th 1100 § 3(a) (1987) (discussing licenses); Frank J. Wozniak,
Annotation, Liability Based on Entrusting Automobile to One Who Is Intoxicated
or Known to Be Excessive User of Intoxicants, 91 A.L.R.5th 1 (2001) (discussing
intoxication).
161
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Pre-existing analogy theories cannot be sensibly applied to an
owner of an autonomous vehicle that negligently provides access to
another. Elevators are not easily moved, and airplanes are not
typically borrowed without a formal contract distributing liability.
The “reasonable car” theory analogizes autonomous vehicles with
human beings,166 but analogies comparing humans to machines are
limited. Elevators and autopilot are both heavily regulated.167
Therefore, it is often quite clear whether it is reasonable to grant
access to an elevator or autopilot to others by looking for an
appropriate license and compliance with various regulations.
The horse analogy theory leads to a more sensible application of
the instrumentality of harm doctrine. Autonomous vehicles lack—
for now—some of the detailed, explicit, and widely-known
regulatory framework of traditional cars, elevators, or airplanes.168
In most states, there is no licensing scheme an autonomous vehicle
owner could rely on to verify a borrower of their vehicle knows how
to use the autonomous features safely.169 Many consumers are
uncertain whether riding a horse or an autonomous vehicle while
intoxicated would be considered against the law. The applicable law
is often determined by a technical statutory interpretation of DUI
laws, rather than by common law.170
166

Webb, supra note 50, at 47.
See, e.g., 50 N.Y. JUR. 2D Elevators and Escalators § 23 (discussing
elevators); 11 N.Y. JUR. 2D Boats, Ships, and Shipping § 191 (discussing pilots).
168
See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Autonomous Vehicles:
Self-driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, http://www.ncsl.org/research
/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enactedlegislation.aspx (last updated Oct. 23, 2017) (showing state-level legislation
focused on either autonomous vehicle testing or empowering regulatory agencies
to develop substantive rules).
169
John W. Terwilleger, Navigating the Road Ahead: Florida’s Autonomous
Vehicle Statute & Its Effect on Liability, 89 Fla. B.J. 26, 26 (2015) (stating that
thus far, only Nevada and California have started passing legislation regarding
special licensing for autonomous vehicles).
170
See generally Commonwealth v. Noel, 579 Pa. 546, 549 (Pa. 2004) (holding
that a statute against driving a “vehicle” while intoxicated was not applicable to
horse-riding, since “vehicles” are defined as “devices” by statute); State v.
Williams, 449 So. 2d 744, 746 (La. Ct. App. 1984), writ denied, 452 So. 2d 172
(La. 1984) (holding that a statute against driving a motor vehicle or other
conveyance while intoxicated did not apply to horse-riding, because the statute
167
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Instrumentality of harm case law for horse accidents is more
analogous to the type of situations that may emerge with
autonomous vehicles. Horse owners can be liable if they knew or
should have known either (1) that the rider of the horse did not have
the skills or knowledge to ride safely, or (2) that the horse had
particular “vicious or violent” propensities.171 If a rider tells the
owner of a horse the rider has “some” experience, the owner may
rely on this statement and be absolved of liability.172 A “vicious or
violent” horse is one having a propensity (not a mere potential) to
“endanger the safety of the persons and property of others.”173 If the
owner warns a rider of the horse’s dangerous tendencies, and the
person borrowing the horse rides anyway, the rider may be
contributorily negligent or have assumed the risk.174 Even a single
incident where a horse acted erratically could be enough to put the
owner on notice of its dangerous propensity and impose a duty to
warn future users of the property about the danger.175
In Macho v. Mahowald, a single incident where a horse bolted
towards an alfalfa patch was enough to raise a jury question as to
whether the owner was on notice of the horse’s dangerous
propensity.176 There, the owner offered an acquaintance a ride on his
daughter’s horse, without providing any warnings about the horse
bolting for an alfalfa patch, as it had on a prior occasion.177 Once the
acquaintance was on the horse, it once again bolted towards the
was intended to cover inanimate vehicles); Katherine L. Hanna, Old Laws, New
Tricks: Drunk Driving & Autonomous Vehicles, 55 Jurimetrics J. 275 (2015).
171
See Macho v. Mahowald, 374 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); 3A OHIO
JUR. 3D Animals § 48 (2017); 3 N.Y. JUR. 2D Animals § 185 (2017); 13 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 2D 473 Knowledge of Animal’s Vicious Propensities § 6 (1977).
172
See Stoffels v. Harmony Hill Farm, 389 N.J. Super. 207, 912 A.2d 184 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); Wickoren v. Diamond T Ranch, 1993 WL 173862, at
2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
173
Macho, 374 N.W.2d at 315.
174
Pitcher, supra note 172, at § 6.
175
Macho, 374 N.W.2d at 315; Pitcher, supra note 172, at § 6 (“The law does
not require “any particular number of instances of unprovocated attack or injury
to show a vicious disposition in an animal, and the jury may draw such inferences
from a single act, especially if it be an attack upon a person.”) (citations omitted).
176
Macho, 374 N.W.2d at 313–14.
177
Id.
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alfalfa patch, throwing the rider against a tree in the process.178 In
State Farm v. Shoaf, the owner of a horse was liable for negligence
when he handed over the reins to an inexperienced rider near a busy
street.179 There, the owner’s knowledge of the rider’s lack of
experience, and of the particular dangers of their surroundings
resulted in a finding of negligence on the part of the owner.180
A hypothetical can illustrate how this case law could apply to
autonomous vehicle owners that negligently provide their vehicle to
another. Consider a situation in which someone loans a car they own
to a friend, who has no experience using autonomous vehicles. The
friend drives manually to get to the freeway, then initiates the selfdriving features near the end of the onramp. However, the friend did
not realize the autonomous features will not engage until the GPS
recognizes the car as being completely on the freeway, and it did not
actually activate on the onramp. The friend stops holding the wheel
and promptly crashes the vehicle. Here, the owner could be
contributorily negligent for providing the instrumentality of harm to
an inexperienced driver, without any warnings or instruction.
C. Assumption of the Risk
A user of a product assumes the risk if the user subjectively
knew and appreciated the danger of an activity but voluntarily chose
to continue in spite of the danger.181 The most important element of
an assumption of the risk defense is that the user of the product had
actual, subjective knowledge of the risks and their magnitude, with
some degree of specificity.182 While the gravity of risk must be
known, the specific manner of injury does not.183 Subjective
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knowledge may be implied by circumstantial evidence, such as the
user’s skill or expertise related to the activity.184
Users of a product may have assumed the risk if they used a
product in an unintended or unforeseeable manner.185 They also
assume risks they acknowledge are inherent in an imperfect product
but pose no special dangers.186 Drivers can assume the risk when
they continue using a vehicle after a dangerous defect becomes
known or the risks are disclosed to them.187 For example, passengers
can assume the risk when they notice the driver is acting erratically,
but do nothing to mitigate the danger.188 Someone that continues
driving despite knowledge of the dangerous condition of the vehicle
is negligent for disregarding the danger.189
Assumption of the risk case law for horse accidents focuses on
the behavior and mannerisms of the horse. Horseback riders assume
the risk a particular horse may not have an “ideal” mannerism.190
They assume risks inherent in horseback riding, such as being
thrown from the horse.191 However, riders do not assume the risk a
horse has particular “vicious propensities” unless they had actual or
constructive knowledge of the special danger.192 Riders that continue
riding their horse despite knowledge of its dangerous propensity
may assume the risk.193
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In comparison to horses, the more predictable and safer nature
of autonomous vehicles may create a narrower scope of assumed
risks. Horses may “buck, run, kick, bite, run, and bolt uncontrollably
. . . without warning and without apparent cause.”194 Riding
horseback is more dangerous than driving a motorcycle or skiing.195
If an autonomous vehicle acted similarly to the horse in Hunting
View Farm and randomly reversed into someone’s shin, the user
probably would not be seen as having assumed the risk, because
more predictable behavior is expected of an autonomous vehicle.
However, overall horse case law offers a more sensible analogy
to autonomous vehicles. Users of an autonomous vehicle may
assume the risk of an imperfect product and may assume the risk
when misusing the vehicle. Manufacturers may be liable when an
autonomous vehicle product has a particular dangerous propensity
that goes beyond the risks a consumer consents to by using the
product. However, users may be liable if they knew of a dangerous
defect and did nothing to avert the danger. Manufacturers can reduce
their liability exposure by ensuring drivers have subjective
knowledge of the risks, such as by disclosing them in the owner’s
manual196 and in an express waiver.197
This application of the assumption of risk doctrine is aligned
with the Department of Transportation’s report on the fatal
autonomous vehicle accident in Florida in which an autonomous
vehicle collided with a truck in an intersection.198 There, the driver
was using the vehicle’s autonomous features on “city streets” even
though they were only intended for highway use.199 Such misuse of
the product could constitute an assumption of the risk. Additionally,
the vehicle’s owner’s manual gave the owner knowledge of the risk
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that the system will not perform well in specific crash scenarios.200
The car’s repeated warnings to the driver201 arguably gave the driver
subjective knowledge of the dangers of failing to maintain vigilance
over the car’s operations.202 While the vehicle could not accurately
interpret the white truck against a bright sky,203 the driver had
subjective knowledge of the risks that he assumed through his
continued use of the product.
Consumers assume the risks they know are an inherent part of
using an imperfect product, but cannot consent to dangers that are
unreasonable or unknown to them. Defects in autonomous vehicles
will likely cause manufacturer liability, but autonomous vehicles
operating within their disclosed limits of performance should not.
D. Product Liability
Generally, manufacturers can be strictly liable for their products
under three possible doctrines: manufacturing defect, design defect,
and warning defect.204 Manufacturing defects are rare in the modern
era because modern manufacturing and software are usually massproduced in a manner that is consistent with design specifications.205
A design defect occurs when a product is unreasonably dangerous
and a reasonable safer alternative design would have mitigated the
risk of harm.206 A warning defect occurs when a potentially
dangerous product is negligently produced and sold without
adequate instructions or warnings necessary to make the product
safer or to warn the consumer of foreseeable risks.207 Manufacturers
do not have a duty to equip the most optimal warnings possible, but
can be liable for using a light on the dash, rather than a more
200
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effective audio alert.208 Generally, more specific warnings are less
likely to result in liability than generalized warnings that may be
difficult to interpret.209
The horse analogy fails when it comes to design and warning
defects. Strict product liability only applies to products that are fixed
in their nature, whereas a horse’s behavior may change based on its
treatment by the owner.210 Additionally, horses are not mass
manufactured with precision in a manner that rarely leads the horse
to deviate from a design.211 Here, it matters that horses are blood and
bone, whereas autonomous vehicles are steel and computer boards.
However, design defects in autonomous vehicles require no analogy
or breakthrough in legal analysis. They place no special burden on
basic principles of product liability.212 Autonomous vehicle design
defects will most likely be analyzed under the same risk-utility
analysis as any other product.213 The Restatement of Torts includes
a seven-factor test for product liability.214
Despite the common prediction that autonomous vehicles will
represent a dramatic shift towards manufacturer liability,215 the
factors lean in favor of only mild liability for manufacturers. For
example, the benefits of the product to society is quite significant

208

James Forrest McKell Jr., Chatter, Clatter, and Blinks: Defective Car Alerts
and the Role of Technological Advances in Design Defect/Failure to Warn Cases,
2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10, 11–12 (2010).
209
Id. at 13.
210
See Christopher H. Hall, Annotation, Live Animal as “Product” for
Purposes of Strict Products Liability, 63 A.L.R.4th 127 § 2 (1988).
211
See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 35, at 1323.
212
See generally Levy, supra note 186 (arguing that autonomous vehicles do
not strain pre-existing product liability concepts); David C. Vladeck, Machines
Without Principals: Liability Rules & Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV.
117, 142 (2014).
213
See generally Levy, supra note 186; Vladeck, supra note 212.
214
Matthew Blunt, Highway to a Headache: Is Tort-based Automotive
Insurance on a Collision Course with Autonomous Vehicles?, 53 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 107, 126–27 (2017) (“[C]ourts typically rely on a set of seven factors
proposed . . . in the Second Restatement of Torts[.]”).
215
See, e.g., Riehl, supra note 31, at 25 (“The advent of autonomous vehicles
points to a seemingly inescapable shift in historical standards for auto crashes—
from driver/owner liability to a product liability regime.”).

158

N.C. J.L. & Tech. On.

[VOL. 19: 127

for autonomous vehicles,216 which are offering a safer alternative to
human drivers.217 Users of an autonomous vehicle can reduce their
exposure to the risks of the product by taking control of the vehicle
when a crash is imminent.218 Users should be aware of the dangers
of the product because those dangers have been widely publicized219
and may also be in the owner’s manual220 or elsewhere.
While the horse analogy is not sensible for product liability, a
design defect analysis does not imply a need for novel analysis or
analogy. Manufacturers can reduce their liability in the usual ways,
by educating users on the risks, making products that benefit society,
equipping users to reduce their own risks, and creating the safest
product reasonably possible. Manufacturers will not be liable
merely for an imperfect product, but may be if their product is
especially dangerous such that the manufacturer was negligent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Horses and autonomous vehicles have more in common than
meets the eye. Both are autonomous property that can perceive their
environment, misinterpret the dangers around them, and engage in
maneuvers the owner would not have authorized. As a result, many
accidents on horses and foreseeable situations for autonomous
vehicle accidents have many analogous facts and elicit similar legal
principles.
The precedent for horse accidents presents a stronger
comparison than pre-existing analogy theories for elevators,
autopilot systems, or humans. Elevators carry no expectation of
216
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oversight from its users, while autopilot systems expect
professional, licensed oversight. Analogizing autonomous vehicles
to human drivers is a novel legal doctrine because the reasonable
person standard has never been applied to property. These analogies
often become an awkward fit when considering complex real-world
scenarios, such as loaning the car to another or other negligent
drivers on the road.
The horse analogy is more sensible for most situations. Horses
and autonomous vehicles both perceive and interpret their
environment, and they sometimes make dangerous maneuvers when
they misunderstand their surroundings. They are both affected by
the actions of other people on the road. Horses and autonomous
vehicles are both property, owned and operated by regular
consumers, that can be borrowed by a friend or used by another.
Common law rules for product liability and negligence vary
from state to state. The future will likely include variations in
autonomous vehicle liability that will develop incrementally
through the common law process. However, this Recent
Development proposes an analogy to forecast liability rules in
autonomous vehicle accidents. It illustrates why autonomous
vehicles will not introduce immense liability exposure to
manufacturers. Rather liability will continue to be imparted where it
is due, based on the party whose negligence caused the accident.

